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Abstract 
Data is drawing from a sample of Chemical firms listed at Karachi Stock Exchange of Pakistan over the period 
2002–2017, this paper investigates the relationship between ownership concentration and dividend policy on 
firm financial performance. Using panel data analysis, the evidence is found to support the assumption of 
a significant relationship between ownership concentration and dividend policy on firm financial performance. 
The findings reveal that ownership concentration has a significant positive association with firm financial 
performance. This stated that larger shareholders can attribute to the alignment of managerial incentives with 
shareholder interests. They also monitor the team very effectively and efficiently. Dividend policy has a 
significant positive relationship with ROA. Leverage and Tangibility have a significant negative relationship 
with financial performance. Board size also has a significant positive impact on firm performance. These results 
potentially can be relevant for policymakers and academic research. 
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1-Introduction  
Firm ownership and management decisions are the primary sources of corporate governance. The mechanism of 
corporate governance is considered an important element in controlling and monitoring the firm operations in 
good and better way(Aslam, Haron, & Tahir, 2019) it also can increase the firm performance (Bhagat & Bolton, 
2008) and firm valuation (Bebchuk, Cohen, & Ferrell, 2008; Cuñat, Gine, & Guadalupe, 2012; Gompers, Ishii, 
& Metrick, 2003).  
The code of corporate governance is an important element in the developing economies. Such as, the code 
of corporate governance of Pakistan  is conducted by the Security and Exchange Commission of Pakistan  
(SECP) in March 2002 (Kazi, Arain, & Sahetiya, 2018) and it is stated that ownership structure plays an 
important role in firm performance (Shah, Xiao, & Quresh, 2019). Basically, the ownership structure and firm 
performance are related to agency theory (Jensen & Meckling, 1976) which resolve the agency issues among 
managers and shareholders.  
From the past years, corporate governance has secured a great interest in the field of finance (Fu, 2019) and 
started from the concept of agency theory (Holmstrom, 1979; Ross, 1973). Many different studies have 
explained that good mechanism of corporate governance can increase the firm valuation and firm performance 
(Bhagat & Bolton, 2008; Cremers & Ferrell, 2014; Cuñat et al., 2012; Giroud & Mueller, 2011). Different 
studies have categorized the corporate governance structure into internal and external governance (Baber, Liang, 
& Zhu, 2012; Gillan, 2006; Weir, Laing, & McKnight, 2002). The internal corporate governance consists of the 
characteristics of the board of directors, board compensation and ownership structure (Jensen, 1993; Jensen & 
Meckling, 1976; Yermack, 1996). The external mechanism of corporate governance is concerned with the 
market rules and regulations, product and services, market competitors and investors control (Jensen, 1986; La 
Porta, Lopez‐de‐Silanes, Shleifer, & Vishny, 1997). 
In this study, we plan to take into account, not only the characteristics of the shareholding, but also the 
dividend policy in Pakistan nonfinancial companies. In fact, managers and shareholders are interested in such 
decision because managers consider the dividend as a positive indicator of their performance, and shareholders 
consider it as an indicator for their investment worthiness and consequently enables them to make the rational 
decisions concerning buying, holding, or selling shares. In this regard (Sáez & Gutiérrez, 2015) argued that 
dividend policy is one of the most important factors of determining the firms’value, and consequently firm 
performance.  
We notice that the Asian socio-economic and behavioral peculiarities and institutional settings are different 
from Western World and studies conducted in Western World have limited implications for Asian countries (Sun, 
Zhao, & Yang, 2010; Van Essen, van Oosterhout, & Carney, 2012). While there is some important evidence on 
the relationship between ownership concentration, dividend policy on firm performance from other Asian 
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countries, the Pakistani context is peculiar for two reasons. First, concentrated and family ownership (presence 
of large shareholders), on one hand, is more common in Pakistan than, for instance, in Japon and Korea. 
Similarly, while Chinese companies have more ownership concentration than in Pakistani companies, the nature 
of ownership concentration is different as the state usually holds high stakes in large companies (Bryson, Forth, 
& Zhou, 2014). On the other hand, concentrated ownership in Pakistan is maintained by nongovernment 
shareholders. No government ownership concentration makes companies like private-owned companies which 
may have different implications on the firm’s performance. Second, we can also observe the legal and political 
environment in Pakistan which is weaker and the overall governance is poor . Besides, we remark that 
government effectiveness index and regulatory quality index estimated by World Bank remained negative in the 
last decade or so.  
Our study contributes to the extant literature in a number of ways. In fact, two main reasons motivated the 
conduction of this study: first, the empirical significance of these studies remains largely unknown especially in 
terms of the relationship between ownership concentration, dividend payout and firm performance. There are 
numerous researches have been carried out to identify the unique characteristics of a firm and how it enhances 
dividend policy (Al-Nawaiseh, 2013; Warrad, Abed, Khriasat, & Al-Sheikh, 2012). These studies investigated 
the impact of ownership structure on dividend policy in the industrial and the service sectors. Moreover, some 
other current studies examined how ownership concentration affects dividend payout, and ultimately firm 
performance, such as in Malaysia context (Ting, Kweh, & Somosundaram, 2017). Dividend paying firms 
enhance firm performance.  A key contribution of this study is that it sheds additional light on the inconclusive 
issues regarding the effects of ownership concentration and dividend policy on firm’s performance in the 
chemical sector, which is still unexplored in an emerging market like Pakistan. Second, other contributions of 
this paper are as follows. Our study considers persistence and adjustment by using panel data analysis.However, 
this study is conducted to fill the research gap on examining the relationship between ownership concentration, 
dividend policy and organizational performance in the emerging market of Pakistan. Rest of the article is 
organized as follows: Literature review and hypotheses development are presented fluently in Section II. After 
that, Section III describes data and methodological procedures. Then, Section IV provides empirical results while 
conclusions are presented lastly in Section V. 
 
2-Literature Review and Hypothesis Development 
2.1- Ownership Concentration and Firm Performance 
The central premise of arguments regarding the ownership concentration and firm performance association is the 
potential trade-oﬀ between two effects: the monitoring (alignment) and the expropriation (entrenchment) eﬀect 
of ownership concentration (Filatotchev, Jackson, & Nakajima, 2013). In fact, dispersion of ownership makes 
controlling difficult and also contributes to creating potential free-riding problems. Predictions of the positive 
eﬀect of ownership concentration on performance’s firm are based on the monitoring eﬀect. Accordingly, 
ownership concentration has a disciplinary eﬀect on managers because it is easier for large shareholders to 
monitor managers (Shleifer & Vishny, 1986). Thereby, from the agency theory, ownership concentration is 
regarded as the key and efficient component of corporate governance mechanism to reduce agency problems 
arising out of the separation of ownership and control (Balsmeier & Czarnitzki, 2017; Nguyen, Locke, & Reddy, 
2015). Thus, a positive association between ownership concentration’s ownership and performance’s firm is 
expected. These expectations are essentially consistent with the monitoring or controlling hypothesis. 
On the other hand, predictions of the negative impact of concentrated ownership on performance are based 
on the expropriation or entrenchment eﬀect (Young, Peng, Ahlstrom, Bruton, & Jiang, 2008). Based on this line 
of research, ownership concentration may facilitate the controlling of shareholders’extraction of private beneﬁts 
at the expense of the wealth of minority shareholders (Filatotchev et al., 2013) thus increasing the expropriation 
eﬀect which, in turn, conducts to the damaging of firm’s performance. According to both eﬀects mentioned 
above, some researchers have found a curvilinear association between ownership concentration and performance  
(Thomsen & Pedersen, 2000; Tuschke & Gerard Sanders, 2003). That is, when the ownership becomes highly 
concentrated, the association between these two variables becomes negative (expropriation eﬀect). So, it is 
expected that: 
H1: Ownership concentration has a significant relationship with financial performance. 
 
2.2- Dividend Policy and Firm Performance 
They are plethora of empirical researchs on dividend policies in the world at large.  In effect, some authors 
have studied the determinants of dividend policies, why some others have investigated the influence of 
dividend policies on performance’s firm in different sectors.  
For instance, from the foreign scene, (Dogan & Topal, 2014) tested the relation between dividend policies 
and financial performances in Istanbul Stock Exchange. The results of the analysis showed that dividend policies 
had an influence on companies’ performances. Also, there was a positive and statistically meaningful association 
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between the dividend payments and market-based performance indicator (Tobin’s q). The study by Kajola et al. 
(2015) revealed that a proportionate change in dividend payout ratio resulted in a proportionate change in firm 
financial performance. In conclusion, the study demonstrated that dividend payout, which is a component of 
dividend policies affects significantly and positively firm performance. These studies are supported by (Farrukh, 
Irshad, Shams Khakwani, Ishaque, & Ansari, 2017; M'rabet & Boujjat, 2016))who examined the association 
between dividend policies and financial performance, the main findings indicated that dividend policies and total 
assets had a significant and positive association with firm performance. 
H2: Return on the asset has a significant relationship with financial performance. 
 
2.3- Leverage and Firm Performance 
Leverage or financing refers to the extent to  which companies make use of their  money,  borrowings  to  
increase  firm profitability. Also, leverage refers to  the  proportion  of  debt  to  equity  in  the  capital  structure  
of  a  company. Generally, this control varibale is measured by total liabilities to equity. The  leverage  decision  
is  a  significant  managerial  decision  because  it  affects  the  shareholder’s  return  and  risk  and  the  market  
value’s firm (Omondi & Muturi, 2013). According to (Alkhatib, 2012), leverage  is  viewed  as  a  result  of  
events  that  determines firms'  source of  financing  to run  the  firm’s business. 
Studying the association between financial leverage and performance in previous literature has mixed 
findings. Firstly, financial leverage can negatively affect firm performance because leverage can be treated as a 
tool for indisciplining management. For instance, the findings of (Ahmed Sheikh & Wang, 2013; Jeleel & 
Olayiwola, 2017; Mireku, Mensah, & Ogoe, 2014; Olokoyo, 2013) found a negative relationship between 
leverage and firm performance. In contrast, some research revealed a linear association.  For example, (Ali, 2014) 
investigated the association between financial leverage and financial Performance evidence of listed chemical 
Pakistani firms. According to the agency theory,  the fundamental idea behind positive or negative cost theory 
depends on the links between shareholders and managers, and those between debt-holders and shareholders 
(Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Based on this perspective, the link is positive when the agency costs of equity 
between shareholders and managers, while it is negative when the agency costs of debt between shareholders and 
creditors.  
H3: Leverage has a significant relationship with financial performance. 
 
2.4- Liquidity and Firm Performance 
Liquidity management is most essential for every company that means to pay current obligations on business, the 
payment obligations include operating and financial expenses that are short term but maturing long term debt. 
Liquidity ratios are used for liquidity management in the form of current ratio, quick ratio and Acid test ratio that 
greatly influence on profitability’ s company. 
A lot of studies has already been conducted on the effect of financial leverage on firm profitability. For 
example, (Kaur & Silky, 2013)and (Malik & Ahmed, 2013) studied all the listed companies on the National 
Stock Exchange of India to analyze the influence of working capital management in terms of liquidity 
management on firm profitability. The revealed result is consistent with the trade-off theory that there is a 
negative association between the current ratio and return on assets (ROA).  In the contrary case, (Alagathurai, 
2013; Ben-Caleb, Olubukunola, & Uwuigbe, 2013) in their studies founded that there is a significant positive 
association between quick ratio’s liquidity and return on assets. Then, the studies revealed that there is a positive 
relationship between cash ratio and profitability. Also, (Zygmunt, 2013) conluded that increase in the growth of 
the cash conversion cycle of liquidity will increase the profitability of Polish IT firms. The research has revealed 
a positive association between ROA and growth of the inventory sale period, collection period & account 
payables period. Moreover, the study showed by (Ismail, 2016) showed that liquidity current ratio has a 
significant positive relationship on firm profitability. 
H4: Liquidity has a significant relationship with financial performance. 
 
2.5- Board size and Firm Performance 
In general, the board of directors size is a governance mechanism which refers to the total number of directors on 
the board. The latter comprises, in effect, executive as well as non-executive directors. Hence, the ideal board of 
directors size varies for each board. Basing on (Mohan & Chandramohan, 2018), the majority of the research are 
oriented towards ascertaining the impact of board size which is an important dimension of corporate governance 
on firm performance. Some of these studies revealed an increase in the effectiveness of the company as the board 
of directors size grows. According to (Agyemang Badu & Appiah, 2017) agency perspective describes the size 
of the board depicting the level of control exercised by management, while some authors suggested the opposite. 
In effect, a decrease in the effectiveness of the company as the board of directors size grows.  
H5: Board size has a significant relationship with financial performance. 
 
Research Journal of Finance and Accounting                                                                                                                                    www.iiste.org 
ISSN 2222-1697 (Paper) ISSN 2222-2847 (Online)  
Vol.10, No.21, 2019 
 
35 
2.6- Firm size and Firm Performance 
According to (Hirdinis, 2019) firm size is a crucial determinant of the profits of the firm. The assets owned by 
the firm indicate whether it is classified as a large or big firm or not. Generally, firm size is measured using Ln 
total assets. Researches on the effect of firm size on firm performance have generated mixed results ranging 
from those supporting a positive relationship among these variables to those opposing it. Basing on (Aduralere 
Opeyemi, 2019)all the study in Nigeria showed that there is a positive relationship between company size and 
company’s performance. However, other research found  a negative or  weak negative  association between  size 
and  firm performance. For instance (Močnik & Širec, 2015)and (Banchuenvijit & Pariyanont, 2012) shed light 
on the factors like firm size, that determines the profitability of a developing company using a sample of 782 
Slovenian fast-growing companies. The result from  the  findings  showed  a  negative association between firm 
company and profitability.  
H6: Firm Size has a significant relationship with financial performance. 
 
2.7-Tangibility and Firm Performance 
Tangibility is considered to be the major determinant of a company’s performance. The most common stated in 
the literature favours a positive association between asset tangibility and performance. For instance, 
(MacKie‐Mason, 1990) argumed that a company with high fraction of tangible assets is the asset base made the 
debt choice more likely and influences the performance’company. Also, (Akintoye, 2008)concludes that a 
company which retained large investments was tangible assets will have smaller costs of financial distress than a 
company that relied on intangible assets.Finally,  (Kothari, Laguerre, & Leone, 2002) concluded that when R&D 
expense increases, the future earning’company will increase as well. Then the relation between asset tangibility 
and company performance is expected to be positive. 
H7: Tangibility has a significant relationship with financial performance. 
 
3-Data and Methodology 
The objectives of the current study are to investigate the relationship between ownership concentration and 
dividend policy on firms financial performance. For this purpose the data has been collected from the annual 
reports of chemical sector listed at Pakistan Stock Exchange (PSE), during the time span of 2012-2017. In PSE, 
there are 42 firms listed in chemical sector but this study has adopted 26 firms due to the inconvenient and non-
avalability of data. 
 
3.1-Variables 
The current study used the following dependent, independent and control variables: 
Table 1: Description of variables 
Variables Label Description 
Return on assets ROA Earnings after tax divided by total assets 
Ownership Concentration OWNR Percentage of equity holds by top 5 substantial shareholders. 
Dividend Policy DP Dividend paid divided by net income. 
Leverage LEV Total debt divided by total assets. 
Liquidity LIQ Current liabilities divided by total liabilities. 
Board size BSZ log of the number of board of directors 
Firm size FSZ Natural logarithm of total assets. 
Tangibility TAN Fixed assets divided by total assets. 
3.1.1- Dependent Variable 
Firm performance is measured through return on assets (ROA) (Briones & Chang, 2017). It is calculated by 
earnings before interest and tax divided by total assets (Murtaza & Azam, 2019; Riaz, 2015); which shows that 
how much a firm earned by investment of the assets and how the managers use effectively the investors fund 
(Vătavu, 2015) or in other words it generates an idea about how efficient management using its assets to generate 
large earnings (Nawaz & Haniffa, 2017). 
3.1.2- Independent Variable 
The current study analyzed ownership concentration (OWNR) and dividend policy are independent variable. 
OWNR is calculated as a percentage of equity held by the top 5 substantial shareholders of the firm (Murtaza & 
Azam, 2019; Paramanantham, Ting, & Kweh, 2018; Xinyuan, Nan, & Yufei, 2017). While dividend policy (DP) 
is calculated as cash dividend divided by net income (Maladjian & Khoury, 2014). 
3.1.3- Control Variable 
Following control are used in this study. Liquidity (LIQ) is measured as the number of current liabilities/ total 
liabilities (Ahmed Sheikh & Wang, 2011; Goh, Tai, Rasli, Tan, & Zakuan, 2018). Tangibility (TAN) is 
calculated by the amount of fixed assets divided by total assets (Goh et al., 2018; Sheikh & Qureshi, 2017). 
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Board size (BSZ), as measured by the log of number of board of directors (Abor, 2007; Kajananthan, 2012; 
Khawaja, Bhatti, Ashraf, & Henry, 2018; Murtaza & Azam, 2019). Whereas leverage (LEV) is calculated as 
total debt divided by total assets (Ilmas, Tahir, & Asrar-ul-Haq, 2018) and firm size (FSZ) is calculated by taking 
the natural logarithm of total assets (Abdullah, 2005; Murtaza & Azam, 2019). 
  
3.2- Empirical Model 
In order to examine the role of ownership concentration and dividend policy on firm performance, we used the 
following model specification: 
ROAi,t = β0 + β1OWNRi,t + β2DPi,t + β3BSZi,t + β4FSZi,t + β5LEVi,t + β6LEVi,t + β7TANi,t + εi,t 
Where, 
ROA = Return on Asset 
OWNR = Ownership Concentration 
DP = Dividend Policy 
LEV = Financial Leverage 
LIQ = Liquidity 
BSZ = Board Size 
FSZ = Firm Size 
TAN = Tangibility 
i= firms 
t= time 
β0 = constant term 
ɛ = error term 
 
4- Empirical Results 
4.1- Descriptive Statistics 
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics 
Variable  Obs  Mean  Std. Dev  Min  Max 
ROA 156 0.088 0.233 -2.295 0.465 
OWNR 156 0.625 0.238 0.119 0.908 
DP 156 0.233 0.698 -1.852 1.817 
BSZ 156 2.085 0.233 1.386 2.565 
FSZ 156 14.382 2.02 7.979 18.818 
LEV 156 1.777 15.885 0.119 198.866 
LIQ 156 2.026 4.486 0.007 45.31 
TAN 156 0.535 0.233 0.018 1 
Table 2, explained the results of descriptive statistics for all dependent and explanatory variables used in 
this study. Total number of observations used in this study are 156. The mean value of ROA is 0.08 with 
minimum value of -2,295 and maximum of 0.465.The average of ownership is 62% having minimum of 0.119 
and maximum of 0.908. The average of DP is 23% having min and max of -1.852 and 1.817 respectively. The 
average value of BSZ is 2.08, FSZ is 14.38, LEV is 1.77, LIQ is 2.12 and TAN with 0.535. 
 
4.2- Correlation 
Correlation table is used to measure the relationship between dependent and independent variables. Results of 
table 3 illustrate the association between dependent and explanatory variables of the current study. All variables 
have positive relationship with ROA except LEV and TAN that have a negative association with ROA. 
According to (Gujarati, 2009) highly correlation of independent will create the multicollinearity issue.  Further, 
the multicollinearity is also measured by variance inflation factor (VIF) as shown in table 4. All the VIF values 
are less than 10, which depicts that there is no multicollinearity issue in the model (Wooldridge, 2015). 
Table 3: Pairwise correlations 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
ROA 1.000 
OWNR 0.023 1.000 
DP 0.290 -0.072 1.000 
BSZ 0.231 -0.288 0.170 1.000 
FSZ 0.283 -0.092 0.076 0.275 1.000 
LEV -0.832 0.086 -0.148 -0.050 -0.201 1.000 
LIQ 0.194 0.160 0.043 -0.051 0.019 -0.023 1.000 
TAN -0.371 -0.157 -0.318 -0.019 0.283 0.169 -0.308 1.000 
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Table 4: Multicollinearity 
Variables VIF 1/VIF   
TAN 1.52 0.656319 
FSZ 1.33 0.750078 
BSZ 1.22 0.820692 
DP 1.19 0.842522 
OWNR 1.16 0.86311 
LIQ 1.15 0.869189 
LEV 1.13 0.885262 
Mean VIF 1.24  
 
4.3- Panel Regression Analysis 
Before estimating the regression analysis, we have tested some basic assumptions such as heteroskedasticity, 
serial correlation, VIF and Hausman test, in order to reduce the spurious results from the data.   
Table 5: Breusch-Pagan test for heteroskedasticity 
         chi2(1)      =     1.16 
         Prob > chi2  =   0.2820 
The current study have used Wooldridge test to measure the autocorrelation problem in data. In this regards, 
the p-value is 0.2241which is greater than 5%. It means that there is absence of serial correlation in our data.  
Table 6: Wooldridge test for autocorrelation 
F(  1,      25) =      1.554 
Prob > F =      0.2241 
Hausman test is used to determine between random effects model and fixed effects model of regression 
(Griffiths, Hill, & Lim, 2008).  This specific model is used to measure that which model is to be fit between the 
fixed effect method and random effect model. The null hypothesis states that random effect model is better to use. 
So, the results of table 7, depicts that random effect model is better to use in this study. 
Table 7: The Hausman Test 
Research model Prob>chi2 Test result 
ROA 0.4262 Random effect method 
Table 8, explained the results of random effect “GLS model” of regression. The regression results reveals 
that OWN has a significant positive relationship with ROA at 1%. Increase in ownership concentration is lead 
with higher firm performance (Perrini, Rossi, & Rovetta, 2008; D. A. Singh & Gaur, 2009; Thomsen & Pedersen, 
2000). Some findings reveal that ownership concentration is negatively related with firm performance (Bektas & 
Kaymak, 2009; Khanchel El Mehdi, 2007; Veprauskaitė & Adams, 2013). While some studies describes that 
there is no relationship between OWN and firm performance (Sacristán-Navarro, Gómez-Ansón, & Cabeza-
García, 2011; Tuschke & Gerard Sanders, 2003). DP also has a significant positive effect with firm performance 
at 5%. These findings are consistent with some previous studies (Farrukh et al., 2017; Tahir, Sohail, Qayyam, & 
Mumtaz, 2016) that explained that firms may decrease agency cost by paying dividend. This support to the 
dividend relevance theory (Gordon, 1963; Walter, 1963). BSZ is significant positively influenced on firm 
performance at 1% (Dalton, Daily, Johnson, & Ellstrand, 1999; Lipton & Lorsch, 1992; S. Singh, Tabassum, 
Darwish, & Batsakis, 2018). Because the larger shareholders build many opportunities for firms as well as they 
also reduce the conflicts among multiple groups of interest. These results are against to the studies of (Chiang & 
Lin, 2007; Nguyen, Locke, & Reddy, 2014). FSZ is also significant positively related with firm performance 
which depicts that smaller firms increase market performance and larger firms enhance accounting performance. 
In other words, smaller firms resolve their issues quickly, while larger firms face many issues. LIQ also has a 
positive significant relationship on ROA. Whereas, LEV is negatively influenced (Campbell & Mínguez-Vera, 
2008) and TAN is also negatively related with firm performance at the level of 1%. High degree of leverage also 
increase the risk of bankruptcy. R-square shows the degree of variation in firm performance due to all 
explanatory variables used in the current study. So, here the value of R-square is 83% and wald chi2 value is 
761.01 that shows the significance of model. 
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Table 8: Generalized Least Squares Model 
ROA Coef. Std. Err. z P>z 
OWN 0.104987 0.034728 3.02 0.003*** 
DP 0.02485 0.011993 2.07 0.038** 
BSZ 0.172085 0.036388 4.73 0.000*** 
FSZ 0.01681 0.004391 3.83 0.000**** 
LEV -0.01105 0.000514 -21.5 0.000*** 
LIQ 0.005005 0.001837 2.73 0.006*** 
TAN -0.21039 0.040643 -5.18 0.000*** 
_CONS -0.46165 0.090855 -5.08 0.000*** 
Observations 156 
R-squared 0.83 
Number of groups 26 
Wald chi2(7) 761.01 
Prob > chi2  0.000 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
5-Conclusion 
The main aim of the current study is to measure the effect of ownership concentration and dividend policy on 
firm financial performance. This study used panel data for the period of 2012-2017 for Chemical firms listed at 
Karachi Stock Exchange of Pakistan. After employing panel data analysis, the findings reveal that ownership 
concentration has a significant positive association with firm financial performance. This stated that larger 
shareholders have a right to minimize the agency cost between managers and shareholders. They also monitor 
the team very effectively and efficiently. They also monitor the team very effectively and efficiently. The 
presence of a controlling shareholder acts as a governance mechanism to discipline the leaders. Dividend policy 
has a significant positive relationship with firm performance. Increase in dividend improve firm performance. 
Tangibility have a significant negative relationship with financial leverage. Board size also has a significant 
positive impact on firm performance. Larger shareholders solve the conflicts of interest among managers and 
shareholders. 
 
5.1-Policy Implications/ Recommendations 
The findings of the current study are beneficial for practitioners, policymakers and stakeholders for 
understanding the importance of corporate governance mechanism. These results can be helpful to the regulatory 
bodies for incorporating the new policies of corporate governance in emerging markets. Further, the results 
provide better output and generally, firms may require to improve the importance and strengthen of corporate 
governance mechanism.  
 
5.2-Limitations 
While the findings of the current study are significant, stable and also have highlighted an extensive body of 
literature towards the relationship between ownership structure, dividend policy and firm performance, but it 
also has some limitations and weaknesses in some aspects. First and foremost, this study has used data of small 
time periods and a limited number of observations due to manually collection of corporate governance data. As 
this one is the first study conducted to examine the linkage between ownership structure, dividend policy and 
firm performance in Pakistan. Therefore, the results cannot compare to any other study that examines the insight 
of Pakistan firms. Second, this sample of the study is limited to chemical sector firms of KSE-100 index, also 
excluded the other sectors and financial firms. So, the results are not encountered all the public listed companies 
of Pakistan. Third, this research is mainly focused on the single country data, by considering the relationship 
between ownership structure and firm performance of Pakistan firms listed at KSE-100 index, the findings may 
not be generalized to emerging markets of other countries. 
 
5.3-Future call 
In the future, it would be interesting to investigate the linkage between ownership structure, dividend policy and 
firm performance in different sectors and or especially in developing countries. Future researchers may carry out 
different other variables of ownership such as family ownership, individual and institutional ownership and also 
can enhance the sample size of firms.  
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